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The distinction between justifications and excuses is a familiar one to most of
us who work either in moral philosophy or legal philosophy. But exactly how it
should be understood is a matter of considerable disagreement. My aim in this
paper is, first, to sort out the differences and try to figure out what underlying
disagreements account for them. I give particular attention to the following
question: Does a person who acts on a reasonable but mistaken belief have a
justification, or only an excuse? One disagreement I highlight concerns the extent
to which justification is primarily about agents rather than about actions (viewed
in isolation from the agents performing them). Those who think, as I do, of "His
action, X, was justified" as "He was justified in doing X" are far more likely to
allow that justfication requires reasonable belief and does not require truth, than
are those who think of "His action, X, was justified" as "Although actions of this
type usually are prohibited, X is in these circumstances in fact permissible. " In
addition to (and sometimes in the course ol) sorting out the differences and tracing
them to some underlying disagreements, I defend the reasonable belief view of
justification against some objections, and argue that, whether or not we continue
to use the term 'justified" in a way that does not require truth (and does require
reasonable belie), we need the concept. Contrary to the claims of some who
reject the reasonable belief view ofjustification, justification thus understood does
not reduce to excuse.
I.
In law, philosophy, and everyday life, we recognize a distinction between
justifications and excuses. Many (though not all) of us think the distinction an
important one. Just how do justifications differ from excuses? I will argue in
favor of tethering justification to reasonable belief rather than to truth (thus
allowing that mistaken self-defense should count as justified as long as the
mistaken belief is reasonable). But I am equally interested in diagnosing where the
disagreements arise. To that end, I will spend some time setting out what is
uncontroversial, seeing how far one can go before bumping up against
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controversy-not, it turns out, very far-and examining the controversies as they
arise. I will suggest that at the root of the disagreements concerning how to
understand justification are (a) ambiguities concerning both the word "right" and
the question "Was S's action justified?" and, related to the latter, (b) differences
concerning the extent to which justification is primarily about agents rather than
mainly about actions.'
Although my focus is on justification and excuse in law, my remarks are by
and large intended to apply to justification and excuse in ethics more generally.
My working assumption is that the distinction between justification and excuse in
law is continuous with the distinction between justification and excuse outside of
law, in the ethics of everyday life.2 It is of course possible that criminal law will
turn out to require a distinction between justification and excuse that is different
from the distinction in ethics, but I would regard it as unfortunate if that were the
case. I thus take it as a strong desideratum in an account of the distinction between
justification and excuse in law that it mirror the distinction between justification
and excuse outside of law.3
I begin with what is familiar and (mostly) uncontroversial so as to trace the
points where disagreements arise.
II.
Defenses (setting aside those based not at all on culpability, and entirely on
pragmatic concerns) are usually classified in philosophy of law and in criminal law
as either excuses or justifications.4  Insanity is an excuse; self-defense is a
Of course justification can be about belief, as well. My view is that it is less about the
action than about the agent (and less about the belief than it is about the person qua believer).
2 1 say "continuous with" rather than "identical to" because some of the concepts deployed to
explain the distinction will no doubt need to be cashed out a little differently in law than in ethics.
For instance, when we say "S is not blameworthy" in the context of criminal law, our concern is that
S not be subjected to punishment (at the hands of the state), and not that S not be looked down upon
by his neighbors for what he did. By "the ethics of everyday life" I mean to indicate that I am
speaking not of justification as it is understood in some particular ethical theory, but of justification
as we use the concept in everyday life.
3 An alternative approach would not speak of justification simpliciter but would instead
separate moral justification from legal justification and take care always to specify which sense of
'justification' is intended. For such an approach, see SUZANNE UNIACKE, PERMISSIBLE KILLING: THE
SELF-DEFENCE JUSTIFICATION OF HOMICIDE (1994); see infra Part VII.
4 A different approach, taken in H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 14-15
(1968), distinguishes three types of defenses: excuse, justification, and mitigation. I find this a
peculiar grouping, blurring two separate issues. One issue is whether the defense is complete or only
partial, complete defenses being those that result in acquittal, whereas partial defenses merely reduce
the crime to a lesser one (usually murder to manslaughter). What Hart calls "mitigation" can be
either formal or informal. Formal mitigation is the same thing as a partial defense, and informal
mitigation is simply the handing out of a lighter sentence than one would otherwise mete out. The
second issue is whether the defense is a justification or an excuse. These strike me as distinct issues,
and although we should leave open the possibility that a justification has to be complete to be a
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justification.5 Admittedly, some defenses are difficult to classify. Provocation, a
partial defense, seems to have elements of both justification and excuse.6 Duress
also poses problems, but less weighty ones. Unlike provocation, it does not seem
to be a hybrid. Instead, depending on the particulars of the case, duress can be a
justification, but usually is only an excuse.7 Although one might take these
difficulties as evidence that the distinction between justifications and excuses is a
hopeless one, I assume for the purposes of this essay that it is not hopeless, and try
to figure out how best to draw it.
I said that duress is "only an excuse," and this (emphasizing "only" rather
than "duress") brings me to a point that I hope is uncontroversial: "justified" and
"excused" are not quite on a par, morally. Given a choice between having some
action of mine deemed justified and having it deemed excused, I would rather that
it be deemed justified. Most people would presumably share this preference. The
reason is that to say that an action is justifted is to say (insofar as we focus on the
action, rather than the agent) that though the action is of a type that is usually
wrong, in these circumstances it was not wrong.8 To say that an action is excused,
justification (and likewise for excuses), I see no reason to take that as a starting point and to shape
our classification of defenses accordingly.
Still another approach is that of Sarah Buss, who argues in Justified Wrongdoing, 31 Nous 337,
338 (1997), that "excuses and justifications are not two distinct sorts of exculpating explanations"
and that a "justification can be an excuse." I hope in another paper to examine her arguments, but in
this paper I start from the premise that they are distinct and try to figure out how best to draw the
distinction.
5 Although usually classified as a justification, self-defense is sometimes classified as an
excuse, the idea then being not that self-defense is permissible, but rather that there is a natural
instinct to defend oneself, and that therefore people cannot be expected to refrain from using violence
when they believe it necessary for self-preservation. See Claire Finkelstein, Self-Defense as a
Rational Excuse, 57 U. PIr. L. REV. 621 (1996). It is hard to see why one would regard self-defense
as a mere excuse unless one holds that killing is always wrong, hence that killing in self-defense is
never permissible; though if one accepts the positive rightness thesis, see infra Part VI, classifying
self-defense as a justification becomes problematic (since in some instances killing in self-defense,
though permissible, would not appear to be positively right).
6 1 address the issue of how to classify provocation in Marcia Baron, Killing in the Heat of
Passion, in SETTING THE MORAL COMPASS: ESSAYS BY WOMEN PHILOSOPHERS (Cheshire Calhoun ed.,
2004); see also UNIACKE, supra note 3, at 13-14. Uniacke classifies provocation as an excuse, as
does Joshua Dressier in his Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some Reflections on a Difficult
Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959 (2002).
7 For discussions of duress, see JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, ch. 23
(3d ed. 2001); ROBERT SCHOPP, JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES AND JUST CONVICTIONS (1998); Joshua
Dressier, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching for Its Proper Limits,
62 So. CAL. L. REV. 1331 (1989); Claire Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account of the Defense
in Law, 37 ARiz. L. REV. 251 (1995).
8 I have spoken just now in terms of actions being justified or excused, but as emerges in
Parts III and IV, I think it more apt to speak of persons being justified in doing X, and of persons
being excused for having done X; see also infra note 25. I should also mention that some would
object to "not wrong" in the italicized statement, claiming that it results in too "weak" a statement of
what it is for an action to be justified. See infra Part VI.
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by contrast, is to say that it was indeed wrong (and the agent did commit the act
we are saying was wrong), but the agent is not blameworthy. The reason why the
agent is not blameworthy can be something about the agent, something about the
circumstances (conjoined with facts about humans in general), or both.9
Care is needed in spelling out exactly what, if we say the agent is excused, we
are denying. We are saying the agent isn't . . . isn't what? Isn't deserving of
punishment and isn't deserving of blame; but also isn't accountable? Not
necessarily; at least, not if "not accountable" means there is nothing he or she
should be expected to do to make amends. If, due to a medication (which I have
taken exactly as the doctor directed), my hands shake, with the result that I break a
piece of your porcelain, I owe you an apology and should offer to buy you a
replacement even though (let us assume) I am not blameworthy. In general, an
obligation to make amends may be in order even if I am not blameworthy-
indeed, even if I acted justifiably. 0
That justifications and excuses are not on a par, morally, is uncontroversial.
One does not want to be excused unless an excuse is called for (or unless the only
alternative is to be punished); and it is called for only if one has done something
wrong. For example, if a colleague says to me, "Of course, we could hardly have
expected you to do X, when you had just given birth a few weeks earlier, so no one
blames you," and I believe that in fact it was not my job to do X, period, I will not
be entirely happy to be told that I am excused. I will be tempted to set the record
straight: Xwas someone else's responsibility, not mine. I did nothing wrong at all.
As noted above, the reason why a person is not deserving of blame can be
something about the person, or something about the situation together with facts
about humans in general. Excuses thus divide into two rather different groups, the
first of which is much more akin to justifications than is the second:
(1) those (such as duress) that come into play because the situation was
such that it was extremely difficult for that actor and would be
extremely difficult for most actors to avoid acting wrongly or
unlawfully; and
9 The reason need not be that the agent did not act voluntarily. Excuses can be in order even
if the agent acted voluntarily; indeed, it seems a mistake to think that excuses ever come into play if
the action was not voluntary. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. Il1, ch. 1 (Terence Irwin
trans., Hackett Pub., 2d ed. 2000); Aristotle clearly sees excuses as coming into play only if the
action was voluntary. He introduces the idea of excuses when he explains that the fact that S did X
voluntarily, where X is something objectionable, does not entail that S is blameworthy for having
done X. Some legal scholars, however, speak of excuses as if they apply primarily and
paradigmatically to involuntary responses. George Fletcher, for example, writes that "[e]xcuses
apply on behalf of morally involuntary responses to danger; they acknowledge that when individuals
merely react rather than choose to do wrong, they cannot fairly be held accountable." GEORGE
FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 811 (1978); see also Finkelstein, supra note 7.
10 This is an established principle in tort law, clearly enunciated in Vincent v. Lake Erie
Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910), and affirmed in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
197 (1974).
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(2) those (insanity being the paradigmatic instance) that come into play
because of some peculiarity about the actor that makes it very
difficult for him or her to act as the law requires.
Being excused on grounds of the second sort is clearly less desirable (barring
ulterior motives, such as qualifying for a disability pension) than being excused on
grounds of the first sort. Still, even an excuse of the first sort is less desirable,
from the perspective of most agents, than a justification.
III.
Although in the previous section I tried to present the distinction in a way that
all can agree on, saving for a little later the disagreements, I found that one cannot
say very much about it without saying something that will raise hackles (to my
mind, philosophically interesting hackles). My classification of excuses will draw
opposition from those (e.g., Douglas Husak) who hold that it is important to
distinguish sharply between appraisals of acts and appraisals of agents, and who
regard the following as imposing a constraint on how justifications and excuses
should be characterized: "By definition, if the facts that comprise the defense
describe the defendant's act, they constitute a justification; if these facts describe
the defendant himself, they constitute an excuse."11 Husak emphasizes that
"justifications focus entirely on actions, not agents" and admonishes Kent
Greenawalt for blurring "the distinction between judgments about acts and
judgments about actors." I do not think it generally important to draw a sharp
distinction between appraisals of actions and appraisals of agents. It is an
undercurrent of both this paper and some of my other work that it is often better to
blur them, speaking in terms of the agent's conduct and thus about both action and
character (as reflected in the agent's choice of this course of conduct and in her
motivation and attitudes). 3
That I reject Husak's definitional claim is evident from my characterization of
excuses. The facts comprising excuses of type (2) describe the agent herself, but
those constituting excuses of type (1) describe the circumstances of the act, human
nature in general (more precisely, what is deemed to be too much, at least in that
particular society, to expect of people-in-general), as well as the agent.
One might, without endorsing the general principle that act-appraisals should
be sharply distinguished from agent-appraisals, nonetheless affirm Husak's claim
1 Douglas Husak, Justifications and the Criminal Liability of Accessories, 80 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 494, 496-97 (1989).
12 Id. at 497. Husak is referring to Kent Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justifications from
Excuses, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (1986).
13 See Marcia Baron, Kantian Ethics, in THREE METHODS OF ETHICS: A DEBATE 32-64 (1997);
MARCIA BARON, KANTIAN ETHICS ALMOST WITHOUT APOLOGY (1995); Marcia Baron, The Ethics of
Duty/Ethics of Virtue Debate and Its Relevance to Educational Theory, 2 EDUC. THEORY 135, 138-43
(1985); see also Michael Stocker, Act andAgent Evaluations, 27 REV. METAPHYSICS 42 (1973).
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that justification applies only to acts, not to agents. Although the claim does not
bear directly on what I said above about excuses, it is very much at odds with my
position on justifications, and therefore needs to be addressed. What reasons are
there (apart from an underlying principle of the sort I have just questioned) for this
position?
If one supposed that the word "justified" is-or should be-used only
prospectively, to announce that actions of this type, though generally illegal
[wrong], are legal [permissible or right] in circumstances C, it would make sense
to say that justification applies only to acts.14 We are announcing that acts of this
type, in these circumstances, are permitted. Something ordinarily wrong is, in that
sense, justified here.
If the claim is that the word "justified" in fact is used only prospectively, it is
patently false. It hardly needs to be pointed out that it is quite common to use the
word "justified" retrospectively to say that So-and-So was justified in doing X.
Perhaps someone will claim that this use of "justified" is just sloppy speech, and
that we either should not use the word retrospectively or should do so only to ask
"Was his action justified?" and never "Was he justified in acting as he did?" I
cannot imagine any reason for this stand (other than the general principle
mentioned above). I see no basis for thinking that to assert that (or wonder if) an
agent was justified in acting as he did invariably involves some mistake or
confusion.
IV.
Although the main point of the previous section was to contest the claim that
justification applies only to acts, not to agents, that discussion also brings to light
an ambiguity that underlies the disagreement over whether to tie justification to
reasonable belief or instead to truth. "Was his action justified?" is ambiguous
between "Was he justified in acting as he did?" and "Was the action-viewed
without any attention to the actor's beliefs and motives-justified?" To see the
non-equivalence of these questions, consider the following example: D killed V out
of revenge, but, unbeknownst to D, V was about to kill him, and would have, had
D not killed V Should we say that D's action was justified? Not if by that we
mean that D was justified in acting as he did. He had no inkling (let's suppose)
that V was about to kill him. Without the belief that he needed to kill V to save his
own life-and without having acted for that reason1 5 -he was not justified in
14 I insert the bracketed words in an effort to keep in mind the question of whether what I say
also applies outside of a legal context.
15 In law-at least in the United States-there is generally no requirement that D have acted
for that reason in order to have a justification; but outside of a legal context, this is something we
would, I think, insist on. Suppose that D set out to kill V to get revenge, and then learned that V was
aiming to kill him. Imagine that although D knew V was aiming to kill him, D killed V not to save
his life-for some reason D does not particularly care whether he lives or dies, as long as he gets the
revenge he is seeking-but for the reason he had at the outset, namely to get back at V for some slight
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killing V.16 Suppose that we instead understand by "his action was justified" that
the action abstracted from the actor's beliefs, motives and ends was justified. Thus
understood, should the claim be affirmed? An affirmative answer is at least
plausible. Killing V, given V's intention of killing D and given that there was no
other way to thwart V, would have been permissible under the circumstances. For
this reason we may want to say that the action was justified.
This ambiguity in "justified"--specifically, in "Was D's action justified?"-
explains some of the disagreement over how justification differs from excuse, and
whether justification should be tied to reasonable belief or to truth. Those who tie
it to truth-holding both that a mistaken reasonable belief cannot render an action
justified and that the action is justified in the scenario just described (where D had
no inkling that V was about to kill him)--conceive of justification as applying
paradigmatically to actions divorced from their particular actors (and from the
actor's beliefs and motives). Those who tie it to reasonable belief-holding (i)
that an action is not rendered unjustified by a mistaken belief about a material
element, provided that the belief is held on reasonable grounds and (ii) that an
action is not justified in the scenario described above (where D had no inkling that
V was about to kill him)-think of "D's action was justified" as meaning "D's
acting as he did was justified." For them (myself among them), justification
applies mainly to actors, the question being "Was he justified in acting as he did?"
I will return to this disagreement in Part VI.
V.
For some of the same reasons why my remarks on excuses might spark
disagreement, Part II might be objected to for what I do not include in my list of
(mostly) uncontroversial points about justifications and excuses and how they
differ. Justifications and excuses are often differentiated in the following way:
(a) "Justifications are defenses that arise from properties or characteristics of acts;
excuses are defenses that arise from properties or characteristics of actors. 17 I do
not take that characterization to be uncontroversial at all; indeed, I reject the claim,
for reasons indicated above.
Other characterizations of the difference between justifications and excuses
that I reject include that (b) it is actions and beliefs that are (or fail to be) justified,
and people who are (or fail to be) excused; and (c) justifications are objective, and
excuses subjective. Regarding (b): as indicated above, people can be justified (or
fail to be justified) in doing X, it is no less correct to speak of a person being
to D. Morally this would seem not to be a case of self-defense. (One wonders too how ready jurors
would be, if they had all this information before them, to acquit D on self-defense grounds).
16 But see UNIACKE, supra note 3, at 20-21. See also infra Part VII.
17 Husak, supra note 11, at 496.
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justified in doing X than to speak of an action being justified.18 I reject (c) both
because justifications have a subjective component,19 and because excuses of type
(1) above have an objective component. Duress (for instance) requires, in the
language of the Model Penal Code, that the actor was coerced to commit the
offense in question "by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his
person or the person of another, which a person of reasonable firmness in his
situation would have been unable to resist.,20 It is not enough that the actor was
"unable to resist"; there is the objective component, as well: a person of reasonable
firmness would in that situation have been unable to resist.
2
'
In addition, justifications are sometimes characterized as follows (quoting
what Paul Robinson presents as the "general principle of justification"):
(d) "conduct is justified if it avoids a greater harm or evil than it causes., 22 This
too I regard not only as controversial, but as mistaken, though for a different
reason than those I put forward in opposition to (a)-(c). As Husak has
emphasized, definitional questions need to be distinguished from substantive
questions. What this entails for purposes of this discussion is that the question of
what justification is needs to be distinguished from the question of when conduct is
justified. I therefore take issue with Robinson for presupposing a particular
normative theory when he puts forward an account of what justification is. To say
what justification is, is not-and should not be' to say what general justificatory
principle we should accept.23
Finally, justifications are sometimes said to differ from excuses in the
following way: (e) If S is justified in doing X, no one has the right to interfere to
stop S from doing X, and anyone has the right to aid S in doing X.24 I will explain
in Part VIII why I think this is doubtful (while granting that it is much more
plausible to assert that justifications have this entailment than to assert that excuses
do).
18 One might argue that this conflates justifications with excuses, and that if we say "S was
justified in doing X" we really mean that S is (or should be) excused, and are simply speaking
sloppily. I will address this objection in Part VII, infra.
'9 Clearly this is a contentious matter. Although it is standard in law to require, for self-
defense (and other justification defenses) the relevant belief, those who support what I call the
material rightness thesis in its pure form reject this requirement. See infra Part VI.
20 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
21 See Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1897, 1898 (1984) (emphasis added), for a critical discussion of this and other ways of
distinguishing justifications from excuses. For challenges to Greenawalt's arguments and to his
thesis that "Anglo-American criminal law should not attempt to distinguish between justification and
excuse in a fully systematic way," see B. Sharon Byrd, Wrongdoing and Attribution: Implications
Beyond the Justification-Excuse Distinction, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1289 (1987).
22 PAUL H. ROBINSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL LAW 665 (1988); see also 1 PAUL H.
ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 21 (1984).
23 Husak, supra note 11, at 498-99.
24 See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARv. L. REV. 949, 971-80
(1985).
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VI.
I now want to bring into focus an assertion from Part II, and leave to one side
the ambiguity discussed in Part IV and the related issue of whether to think of
justification as applying primarily to actors or to actions. If we set that aside, 25 I
think almost everyone can assent to the following way of differentiating
justifications from excuses (depending on how "right" is understood): To say that
an action is justified is to say that although it is of a type that is usually wrong,
under these circumstances it was right. To say that an action is excused is to say
that it was wrong (and the agent did indeed commit the act we are saying was
wrong), but the agent is not blameworthy. Supposing agreement on this, let's see
where disagreements arise once details are filled in, and ambiguities attended to.
One disagreement can be traced to an ambiguity concerning the word "right";
the other is due in part to another such ambiguity, and in part to the issue that I am
setting aside for now (concerning whether justification is primarily about persons
or primarily about actions).
One's action is justified, it is widely held, only if, under the circumstances, it
is right; but some (myself included) intend by "right" in this context simply "not
wrong," while others mean something more. "Right" can mean simply permissible
or it can mean obligatory (or something in between permissible and obligatory).
Understood in the more restrictive way, "right" can mean, among other things,
"obligatory" or "morally best" or (say some) "morally recommended"-and it is a
further source of confusion that those who hold that it cannot, for purposes of
justification, include the merely permissible may differ on exactly how it should be
cashed out.
Second, although when we speak of an action being right we often mean (a)
that it was right materially (for example, if we are consequentialists, that it did in
fact bring about the best consequences compared to other actions available to the
agent at the time), we sometimes mean (b) that it was right formally, meaning that
it was the right choice (or at least, a permissible choice) for an agent in that
situation to make at that time, given the information that was available to him
(given what he knew and!or should have known).26 The idea in (b) is that a
reasonable person in that situation might well have opted as the agent in question
25 The only problem is that it is not possible to set them entirely aside, for it is impossible to
come up with a statement that brings out the issue I want to bring out yet is neutral between putting
the focus on actions, and putting it on agents. I of course want it to be on agents, but it would
unfairly help my case to so frame it. So I have opted (here and in Part II) to frame the contrast in a
way that, by speaking in terms of actions, favors a view opposed to mine.
26 1 chose the terms "materially" and "formally" rather than "objectively" and "subjectively"
because "subjectively wrong" suggests "wrong according to the agent"-and that is not the idea at
all. Relatedly, "materially" and "formally" have the advantage that neither one sounds as if it is an
inferior, or watered down, version of the other; whereas "subjectively wrong" sounds less fully
wrong than "objectively wrong."
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did.27 In consequentialist terms, "formally right" would mean that it was the right
choice because a reasonable person in the agent's situation might well have judged
that action to be the one most likely to bring about the best consequences.
That "right" can mean either permissible or something more is obvious, and
requires little comment. That legal scholars differ accordingly as to how to
understand "justified" is also well known. The disagreement is prominent enough
that careful statements of what it is for an action to be justified are often put
disjunctively so as to reflect both views. H.L.A. Hart writes that a justified act is
one that "the law does not condemn, or even welcomes, 28 and Joshua Dressler,
quoting Hart, draws attention to the fact that "'justification'
... may imply a positive judgment about conduct ... or. . . may constitute a
weaker value judgment. . . . Some scholars believe that the concept of
'justification' necessarily implies the stronger meaning; others favor an
interpretation broad enough to include both characterizations. 29 I will refer to the
view that justification necessarily implies the stronger meaning as the positive
rightness thesis.
By contrast, the other ambiguity has received little attention in the context of
justification, and since space does not permit me to discuss both at length, I will
devote more discussion to it and to the disagreements that can be traced to it (more
precisely, traced to it and to the issue I said I would set to one side, concerning
whether justification is primarily about persons or primarily about actions).30
Whatever degree of goodness or rightness one thinks necessary for
justification, there is room for debate as to whether conduct can be justified if the
conditions for the action's permissibility do not obtain, but the agent believes on
reasonable grounds that they do. Which stand one takes will be shaped by whether
one thinks of "right" in this context as "formally right" or as "materially right."
27 Exactly how to understand "reasonable person" is a topic that I cannot take up here, apart
from offering two comments. First, I purposely said "might well have opted" rather than "would
have opted" because I think it a mistake to suppose that all reasonable people would arrive at
precisely the same decision, in any given situation, given the same information. There may be more
than one reasonable option. Second, I understand "reasonable" objectively rather than subjectively
and understand "objectively reasonable" in a fairly broad sense, roughly as spelled out in People v.
Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986), though substituting "person" for "man" in the instruction
endorsed there. I discuss the question of how "reasonably believes" should be understood for
purposes of self-defense in Self-Defense: The Reasonable Belief Requirement (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
28 HART, supra note 4, at 13.
29 DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 206 n.8; see also Joshua Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A
Brief Review of the Concepts and the Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REv. 1155 (1987). Some, however,
speak as if there is no controversy. See Finkelstein, supra note 5, at 624: "In the criminal law, to call
a violation of a prohibitory norm justified is to say not only that it is permissible, but that it is
encouraged"
30 For discussions of the positive rightness thesis (with particular attention to Fletcher), see
Husak, supra note 11, at 499-504; Joshua Dressier, New Thoughts About the Concept of Justfcation
in the Criminal Law: A Critique of Fletcher's Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REv. 61, 69-87
(1984); see also supra text accompanying note 22.
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Those who understand "right" as "materially right" hold that S's reasonable
but false belief cannot justify her conduct. If S reasonably but falsely believes that
Joe is about to attack her (and that she can avoid injury only by attacking him), her
belief does not change the fact that her attack on him was unnecessary. An action
can be justified, it is claimed, only by the way things are. An action taken in
mistaken self-defense thus cannot be justified, though it may be excusable. An
action is justified only when it is materially right-only when it is not based on a
false belief regarding the material elements of the defense. (Here, too, "right" can
be understood either as merely permissible or as more than that; for simplicity, I
will speak in terms of permissibility). If the conditions for the permissibility of the
action do not obtain, the agent's believing-even reasonably-that they do obtain
does not make it so, and so the action is not justified (and the agent is not justified
in so acting). Those who endorse this position-which I will call the material
rightness thesis--do not claim that although the action was not justified, the agent
was justified in so acting, so I will construe the material rightness thesis to entail
that one cannot be justified in doing A if A is based on a false belief (about
something the truth of which is crucial for A to be permissible).3'
There are two possible versions of the material rightness thesis. In its pure
form it holds that belief is not required at all; an act of killing another is justified if
the victim was about to kill the attacker (and would have, had the attacker not
killed him), even if the attacker was unaware of this. The other form requires both
that V was in fact about to kill D and that D believed this. In other words, one
version requires only that V was about to kill D; the other requires this together
with a belief on D's part that V was about to kill D. I will refer to the latter as the
qualified material rightness thesis. 32 It is qualified in that it does not allow that
material rightness alone suffices for justification; justification requires the relevant
belief, as well as material rightness.33 (We might also subdivide the qualified
31 The positive rightness and material rightness theses are logically distinct, but they lend
each other support. In addition, both are nourished by (though they do not require) a consequentialist
outlook, and in particular, a consequentialist outlook that evaluates actions in terms of the states of
affairs that they bring about. For an example of an endorsement of both theses-an endorsement that
reflects a consequentialist outlook-see ROBINSON, supra note 22, § 21; see also infra text
accompanying notes 45-46.
32 Those who endorse the material rightness thesis in its pure form include MICHAEL S.
MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 65 (1997); 2 ROBINSON, supra
note 22, § 121(c); Heidi M. Hurd, Justification and Excuse, Wrongdoing and Culpability, 74 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 1551, 1563-65 (1999). John Gardner holds the qualified view; see John Gardner,
Justifications and Reasons, in HARM AND CULPABILITY 105,117 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds.,
1996), as does Claire Finkelstein, supra note 5, at 625-3 1, and FLETCHER, supra note 9, at ch. 10.
33 Although self-defense law in the United States typically follows the reasonable belief view
of justification, there are some exceptions. North Dakota v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983),
endorses the qualified material rightness position. Justice Walle wrote in Leidholm: "[A] person who
believes that the force he uses is necessary to prevent imminent unlawful harm is justfied in using
such force if his belief is a correct belief; that is to say, if his belief corresponds with what actually is
the case. If, on the other hand, a person reasonably but incorrectly believes that the force he uses is
necessary to protect himself against imminent harm, his use of force is excused." Id. at 815.
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material rightness thesis into two forms: one holds that the belief has to be
reasonable, as well as true; the other denies that it has to be reasonable. I shall in
what follows ignore that complexity).
In the remainder of this essay I will argue against both versions of the
material rightness thesis. I will argue, in other words, both that justification
requires a belief that the facts are as they would have to be for the action to be
permissible, and that justification does not require that the belief be true (as long as
it is held on reasonable grounds).34 There is much more to say than I have the
space to say here, and I will not be able to do more than put a dent in the support
enjoyed by the material rightness thesis. I shall focus not on reviewing the
literature, but rather on addressing what seem to me to be the strongest arguments
for the material rightness thesis.
VII.
Fortunately, my remarks in Parts III and V have already done some of the
work of undercutting arguments for the material rightness thesis. That justification
requires truth and does not require (reasonable) belief is supported by the claim
that justification does not apply to agents, but only to actions; and I called that
claim into question.
The fact, to which I drew attention in Part VI-that "right" is used not only to
mean "materially right," but also "formally right"-also helps to weaken the case
for the material rightness thesis. Although the distinction is unlikely to be news to
anyone who has written on the subject of justifications and excuses, it seems not to
be sufficiently attended to. It is familiar enough; we employ the notion of formal
rightness when we say that while, with hindsight, it is clear that action A was the
wrong choice, it is also clear that the agent acted as well as anyone in that situation
could have acted. Notice that the claim is not that she acted as well as we could
expect anyone in that situation to have acted. That might suggest an excuse (the
thought being that it would be too much to ask of a person that he or she opt for
what in fact she should have seen as the right choice). We are not excusing the
actor. Rather, we are recognizing that although it later turned out that contrary to
Leidholm requires for justification both truth and a reasonable belief "that circumstances exist which
permit him to use defensive force." Id. at 815-16. To see the contrast between this view and more
typical treatment of self-defense and justification in general in the United States, see DRESSLER,
supra note 7, at 214-15.
34 Because of space limitations, I will say less on the question of whether belief should be
required than on the question of whether truth should be. I think the importance of requiring belief is
less in doubt than the claim that reasonable belief suffices for justification. As Arthur Ripstein
observes, "The person who uses deadly force without believing his life is in danger was prepared to
use that force without being in danger. Since the danger is irrelevant to his use of force, such a
person is no different from the person who kills in the absence of danger. As a result, he should not
be able to avail himself of self-defense." ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE
LAW 192 (1999).
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what a reasonable (and duly diligent) person would have anticipated, the action
was (materially) wrong, the actor's conduct was beyond reproach.
If it is objected that the fact that we recognize and regularly employ a
distinction between formal and material rightness thesis does not decide anything
for or against the material rightness thesis, I grant that point; nonetheless, the
distinction brings into relief a problem that confronts us if we hold the view that
justification requires truth. The view either ignores the possibility that an action
can be formally right but not materially right, or holds that it has no bearing on
how the actor should be viewed. If the latter, the view presumably is that it does
not matter whether the actor is seen as having erred-erred in a way that deserves
to be excused given the weakness of human nature or the particular disabilities of
the agent--or is instead seen as having conducted himself admirably, or at least
adequately. But to most of us, I think, it does indeed matter whether we are told,
"We won't blame you; we understand that it would be too much to ask you to do
better than you did"; or instead, "We won't blame you; for heaven's sake, you
conducted yourself in a way that was exemplary [or at least: perfectly
reasonable]." As Hamish Stewart has put it, a system of criminal law ought not
say that "a person who has acted reasonably on a reasonably held belief has done a
criminal wrong (even an unpunishable one). 35
The distinction between formal and material rightness helps us detect
arguments that trade on the ambiguity. "[M]istakes cannot justify homicide,"
writes Fletcher; and that sounds like a compelling reason for tying justification to
truth if we think of "justify" as meaning that it makes materially right what
otherwise is not materially right.36 "Justify" is a slippery term, and when we are
thinking of material rightness, we are thinking of the action in isolation from the
actor. If it is asked, "Under what circumstances is intentional killing justified?",
"When the actor was mistaken" is not a good answer, not even part of a good
answer. "When the actor mistakenly thought, and on reasonable grounds, that the
elements that warrant the use of lethal force in self-defense were present,"
although better, is still on the wrong track, for the question calls for an answer that
explains the circumstances in which intentional killing is materially right. But the
35 Hamish Stewart, The Role of Reasonableness in Self-Defence, 16 CANADIAN J.L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 317, 336 (2003).
36 Fletcher, supra note 24, at 973. Another argument that loses some of its punch once the
distinction between formal and material rightness is attended to comes from Michael S. Moore:
If you mistakenly believe that another is trying to kill you and you use deadly force
in self-defense, you might in ordinary idiom be said to be "justified" in what you did.
But what you did was in fact wrong-it was a non-necessary killing-no matter how
reasonable you may have been in believing and acting as you did. Your mistake is
wholly irrelevant to the wrongness of your action, relevant as it may be to your
culpability for doing that wrongful action.
MOORE, supra note 32, at 65. It is indeed irrelevant to the material wrongness of your action but not
to its formal wrongness.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
latter answer is-or so I claim-part of the correct answer to the question, "Under
what circumstances has an agent acted justifiably in intentionally killing another?"
Fletcher's argument is far less compelling once we attend to the ambiguity of
"justify."
I turn now to some arguments, not already mentioned, in support of tethering
justification to truth rather than to reasonable belief. The first takes as its target the
requirement, for justification, that the agent have the relevant beliefs. Legal
justification should be distinguished from moral justification, the argument goes;
and for purposes of legal justification, it does not matter whether the agent held the
relevant belief(s). If we think it does, that is because we are confusing legal
justification with moral justification.37
In support of the claim that legal justification should be distinct from moral
justification, one might point to the sharp contrast between legality and morality
(at least from a Kantian perspective). Legality requires only that my conduct
conform to the law, not that I realize it does, nor that my motivation be this rather
than that. Morality, on the other hand, requires not just that my actions not be
"outwardly" immoral, but that my motivation be what it should be-or at least not
be what it should not be. I act lawfully when I do not steal, even if I refrain from
stealing only because I am afraid of being either injured or arrested, whereas
morality (Aristotelian and Kantian, anyway) requires that I refrain for the right
reasons. Likewise, I act immorally if I have sex with someone I believe to be a
minor (assuming, at least, that I am more than just a year or two older than the age
I take him to be), even if in fact he is not a minor; but (unless I am violating some
other law, for example, a law prohibiting attempted statutory rape) if he is not a
minor, the fact that I believe he is does not make my action illegal. And, one
might go on to say, I do not act illegally in these circumstances.
This lends some support to the claim that if I kill someone out of a desire to
get revenge, not knowing that unless I kill him, he will kill me, I cannot be guilty
of murder because I have a justification for having killed him: he would otherwise
have killed me. For, one might argue, the claim sounds peculiar only to those who
conflate legal with moral justification. If we do not, we can grant that morally I
was not justified in killing him, while at the same time maintaining that legally, I
was.
38
37 This argument is loosely suggested by UNIACKE, supra note 3, at ch. 2, but her position is
more nuanced. She draws a distinction between agent-perspectival justification and objective
justification, and holds that the former is compatible with the agent having a mistaken belief, while
the latter is not.
38 I should note here another point that is sometimes introduced in an effort to lay to rest
misgivings about allowing that someone who killed in such circumstances was legally justified in
acting as he or she did. "Surely," the person with the misgivings says, "I should be no less liable for
murder if I killed out of revenge, not knowing that the victim in fact was about to kill me, than if I
killed out of revenge and the victim was not about to kill me. My culpability is the same in each
case." In reply it is pointed out that things are not as bad as they might seem; in the latter scenario I
would not be off the hook, legally. Although it is true that I could not be convicted of murder, I
could still be convicted of attempted murder. Those who still are dissatisfied are invited to think
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But does that last point really hold up? Does the distinction between legality
and morality really support the distinction between legal justification and moral
justification? No. It would if the point of justifications were to defeat the actus
reus requirement (and if we agreed that the actus reus of murder is unlawful
killing, building into the definition of "unlawful" that the victim had not been
about to kill the defendant). Then, because there is no moral analogue to the actus
reus requirement, we could say that legal justification does differ importantly from
moral justification: once the actus reus requirement is shown not to be met, there is
no possibility of convicting the accused of that particular crime. If self-defense
and the other justifications were not affirmative defenses but a way of showing that
the elements of the offense had not been proven, then yes, we could plausibly
claim that D, who killed V without realizing that V was about to kill D--indeed,
without realizing that V was about to attack D at all-was justified in killing V.3 9
Let's imagine that that is the point of self-defense and the other justifications.
If it is, and if we decide to understand justification to require truth and not to
require belief, we will then need another term for what many of us call
"justifications" (and what is understood as justification in Anglo-American self-
defense law). Put differently, if justifications are to be understood as ways of
defeating the actus reus requirement, we will need to enrich our conceptual
apparatus so as to have something besides excuses, on the one hand, and on the
other, justifications as they are understood in the proposal being considered (i.e., as
ways of showing that the actus reus requirement is not met). This attempt to
buttress the material rightness thesis by claiming that the position seems
counterintuitive only to those who conflate legal justification with moral
justification has a cost. It gets rid of the notion of justification in law by dissolving
it into something different, namely, into negation of the act element.
Of course it might be argued that we can easily enough make do with excuses,
on the one hand, and, on the other, arguments to show that the actus reus
about how it works in general with attempt crimes (specifically, those that involve a mistake
regarding a material element of the crime): If I shoot someone, aiming for the heart, but he turns out
to be wearing a bulletproof vest, I am liable only for attempted murder, not for murder; yet I am just
as culpable as if I had killed him.
Should that lay to rest all misgivings about liability in the case where I kill out of revenge
someone who was about to kill me? I think not. First, we might take issue with the differential
treatment of those guilty of such attempts and their "successful" counterparts. Second, we might
question the parallel. In the bulletproof vest case, I really was attempting but not succeeding in doing
something: I was attempting to kill someone, but failing because he was shielded by his vest. But in
the other case, I did exactly what I set out to do. What we have is a completed crime, not an
attempted one.
39 I am relying here on the distinction between offense and defense, and the classification of
self-defense as a defense; but I take it that is not problematic, since among most legal theorists
neither the distinction nor the classification of self-defense as a defense is controversial. And there
are constitutional reasons for sharply distinguishing between negating the elements of the offense and
offering an affirmative defense (at least in the United States). See DRESSLER, supra note 7, at 201-
02.
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requirement (or for that matter, the mens rea requirement) was not met. It might
be argued, in other words, that justifications understood as applying mainly to the
agent-where we are saying "S was justified in doing A" or "S's doing of A was
justified"-are really just excuses, thinly disguised. My reply is as suggested
above: we are all well aware that there is a difference between being judged to
have acted on reasonable beliefs (i.e., reasonably), and being judged to have acted
in a way that is wrong but not blameworthy. The difference is particularly striking
if one has acted "as the most competent practitioner in his field would have
acted. 4 0 One would be understandably miffed (if not outraged) to be told that
what one did was "excusable" if one had done everything as well as anyone
possibly could have in the circumstances (given the information accessible to one,
and which, let's imagine, one went to some trouble to obtain).
VIII.
I turn now to a set of objections often put forward by those who hold that
justification requires truth. 4' The first concerns the right to resist an attack.
Assuming that the right to resist turns on whether the attack is justified, those of us
who hold that justification requires only reasonable belief, and not truth, seem to
be stuck with the unfortunate implication that if I am attacked by someone who
mistakenly but reasonably believes that I was about to attack her, I do not have the
right to resist her assault. After all, she is acting justifiably-if we allow mistakes
to be compatible with justification. Hence, I am not justified if I resist her attack.
Something seems wrong here, and the problem is thought to lie with the
reasonable belief view of justification. To avoid what everyone agrees would be a
bad implication-that I am not justified in resisting the attack of someone who
attacks me, if she mistakenly (but reasonably) believed that I was about to attack
her-it is suggested that we need to say that she was not justified (so that we can
then say that I am justified). But the problem lies elsewhere: the critics are
forgetting to drop their own notion of justification when they formulate what is
supposed to be a problem for the reasonable belief view. If I am attacked by
someone, then whether I am justified in resisting attack depends not-on the
reasonable belief view of justification-on whether my attacker is in fact justified
in attacking me; it hangs, rather, on whether I believe, on reasonable grounds, p,
40 Greenawalt, supra note 21, at 1909.
41 The main source of these is George Fletcher, though others have endorsed the objections.
FLETCHER, supra note 9, at 762 n. 11 ("A valid justification ... affects a matrix of legal relationships.
The victim has no right to resist, and other persons acquire a right to assist-apart from one exception
that need not detain us," namely, "the case in which the person behind the scenes exploits a justifying
set of facts in order to inflict harm on another"); see also Dressier, supra note 29, at 1173 ("If A
provides D with a gun in order to kill V, and D is acquitted on the ground of self-defense, it follows
that A should also be acquitted of the offense since she has aided the primary party to commit a
socially acceptable act."). Elsewhere, however, Joshua Dressier calls this into question. See
Dressier, supra note 30, at 95-97.
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where p stands for all those things which if true, render what would otherwise be
unlawful aggression, lawful. So what matters is that I reasonably believe that her
attack on me is unlawful-not whether it really is. That means that if she believes
incorrectly, but on reasonable grounds, that I am about to attack her, then as long
as I reasonably believe that she is not justified in attacking me, I am justified in
resisting her attack.
Now this approach may seem to save the reasonable belief view of
justification from one attack only to open it to another. For what if (improbable
though it hopefully is) I realize that she does-or at least did-have reason to think
that I was about to attack her? (Right behind me is a "Wanted: Armed and
Dangerous" poster and the person pictured in fact looks a lot like me; on top of
that, I realize that some gestures I made might have suggested belligerence). Does
this mean that, recognizing that perhaps she was justified in her attack, I am not
justified in resisting her attack? That surely does not sound right. But how are we
to handle the problem? 42 Critics suggest that the solution is to give up on the
reasonable belief view of justification, so that what matters is not what she
reasonably believes, but what is true. The solution helps here, because I know that
in fact I am not the person pictured in the "Wanted" poster. But notice that it does
not help in other cases involving mistakes where the issue is third party
intervention. If, as in the much-discussed case of Young, 43 a third party (good-
heartedly and maybe even heroically) comes to the aid of a youth who is struggling
against what turn out to be plainclothes police officers, it seems wrong to say that
the action of intervening was unjustified. On the reasonable belief view, Young's
action was justified (assuming he had reasonable grounds, as it appears he did, for
his belief that the youth had a right to use force to defend himself, and for his
belief that he needed to use force to prevent further harm to the youth). On the
view that justification requires truth, not reasonable belief, Young's action was not
justified.
What we have here are some paradoxes concerning mistaken self-defense,
some of which are better handled by the (qualified) material rightness thesis, while
others are better handled by the reasonable belief view of justification. Rather than
take the paradoxes to show that the reasonable belief view of justification is
wrong-headed, we should explore the paradoxes themselves, with a willingness to
call into question such commonly accepted principles as that two people cannot
both be justified in resisting each other, and that if and only if S is justified in using
force in self-defense, anyone is justified in helping her (and no one is justified in
thwarting her efforts).44
42 Consider Ripstein's solution, according to which (a) someone whose actions give rise to a
reasonable belief that he is an aggressor should therefore be considered an aggressor and (b) mistakes
regarding identity are not justifications but are (assuming, presumably, that the mistakes are not due
to negligence or recklessness) excuses. See RIPSTEIN, supra note 34, § 6.4.
43 People v. Young, 183 N.E.2d 319 (N.Y. 1962).
44 For a paper that takes a hard look at such principles, in particular, at the principle that
justifications cannot conflict, see Douglas N. Husak, Conflicts of Justification, 18 LAW & PHIL. 41
2005] 403
OHIO S TA TE JO URNA L OF CRIMINAL LAW
There is reason to doubt the principle that if and only if you are justified in
doing A, anyone is justified in assisting you in doing A. Certainly outside of a legal
context it does not always hold. I may be justified in saying something cutting in
reply to S's cutting remarks towards me; but it does not follow that others are
justified in joining me in directing cutting remarks towards S. If it is supposed to
follow from the fact that I am justified in defending myself that you are justified in
defending me, we need to hear what the suppressed premises are. It will not do to
invoke a general principle to the effect that if one is justified in doing A, others are
justified in aiding one in doing A .45 The ethics of intervention-be it in another
country's affairs, another person's affairs, and for the defense of others or for other
reasons-are not a simple matter. It is implausible to suppose that we can read off
the justifiability of a third party intervention from the justifiability of the
principal's conduct.
What about Fletcher's claim that it is "contradictory to say that both sides to
the conflict were justified in their use of force"? 46  Or, as Fletcher puts it
elsewhere, labeling it "the 'incompatibility thesis' .... "[in] any situation of physical
conflict, where only one party can prevail, logic prohibits us from recognizing that
more than one of the parties could be justified in using force. ' '47 Where is the
contradiction? How can logic prohibit us from recognizing that more than one of
the parties could be justified in using force? As far as I can tell, Fletcher's
principle seems valid only if we either presuppose the positive rightness thesis or
for some other reason already accept the view in support of which the principle is
put forward, namely that justification is incompatible with mistakes, and thus is
tied to truth, rather than to reasonable belief. If one rejects that view and accepts
(1999). I regret that I learned of this paper only as I was making final revisions on my paper, too late
to draw upon it in my discussion.
45 Judith Jarvis Thomson discusses these issues in Self-Defense, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 283,
306 (1991), pointing out that sometimes defending another would "constitute 'barging in,' meddling,
interfering," and that there are also times where "people should be left to fight their own battles, even
at the cost of losing some." A consideration she does not mention but that I think should weigh in is
the evidentiary one: there is, arguably, reason to permit acting on slightly scantier evidence in defense
of oneself or one's child (or perhaps another loved one) than should be required before one acts if one
comes upon two strangers, one of whom is attacking another. In addition, there will (depending on
the mode of the attack) often be ways a third party can intervene that are not open to the person being
attacked-to call the police, or to spray the attacker with a hose or otherwise thwart the attack
without attacking the attacker. In any case, the situation of a third party is very different from that of
the person who is under attack, and so one cannot lead off from the fact that the person under attack
is justified in using force that a third party also is. The third party must also believe on reasonable
grounds that using force is necessary, and different considerations will factor in, in support of (or
against) that belief.
46 FLETCHER, supra note 9, at 767. Fletcher writes, "It would strike most Continental theorists
as contradictory to say that both sides to the conflict were justified in their use of force" and makes it
clear that he is siding with the Continental theorists. Id. Arthur Ripstein observes that Fletcher's
principle poses a challenge not only to the reasonable belief view of justification, but to Fletcher's
view of justification, as well. RIPSTEIN, supra note 34, at 197-201.
47 Fletcher, supra note 24, at 975.
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the reasonable belief view of justifications, there will be nothing obviously wrong
in allowing that in such a sad situation, both parties may be justified in using
force-though of course that need not mean, unless we accept the positive
rightness thesis, that we think using force was commendable.4 8
A third principle that is often invoked in arguments against the reasonable
belief view of justification is that resistance of a justified act is never justified.
This is sometimes thought to be established by Ploof v. Putnam.49 But is it?
Recall the facts of the case: the plaintiff and his family were sailing their sloop
when a sudden storm left them no choice (short of risking death) but to moor the
sloop to the defendant's dock.50  The defendant's servant "willfully and
designedly" unmoored the sloop, thereby destroying the sloop and causing injury
to the plaintiff and his family.51 The wharf owner was liable for damages, for the
employee's resistance was unjustified (and the master was held legally responsible
for his servant's actions); and it was unjustified because the plaintiff was doing no
wrong, given the violence of the storm, in mooring it to another's dock.52 The
employee had no right to unmoor the sloop.
If we try to express this by saying that one is never justified in resisting an
action that itself is justified, we invite confusion, given the ambiguity of
"justified." Do we mean that one is never justified in resisting something that
itself is permissible, even if the agent has every reason to think that what the other
is doing is impermissible? That conclusion-and the implication that mistaken
self-defense is never justified-is certainly not suggested by Ploof It is an
important, but not very striking, feature of Ploof v. Putnam that the employee
knew there was a storm and thus should have been able to tell that the yachtsman
acted permissibly in mooring the sloop to his master's dock. There is no room for
a reasonable mistake here. (It also is a relevant, and very obvious, feature that
there was no risk-except possibly slight damage to the dock-in allowing the
family to moor their sloop to the dock, while the risk to the family if they did not
help themselves to the dock was great). The lesson from Ploof (apart from any
lessons about the responsibility of masters for their employees' actions) is thus
best summarized as "[o]ne is never justified in resisting an action which one
knows, or should know, is permitted" (and one might add "especially when the
permissible action is necessary for avoidance of serious bodily injury"). That is
48 It should be borne in mind that what was a reasonable belief may cease to be a reasonable
belief if new information comes to light. On a reasonable belief view of justification, then, one
would not continue to be justified in intervening if it became clear (or if a reasonable person in the
agent's position would have noticed) that the "attackers" were police officers attempting to make a
lawful arrest.
4' 71 A.2d 188 (Vt. 1908).
S0 Id. at 188.
5' Id. at 189.
52 Id. at 189-90.
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less ringing than "It is never justified to resist a justified action," but it avoids
ambiguity and better captures the point.
I hope to have shown in this paper some of the disagreements (including
different ways of cashing out "right") that underlie the disagreements about what
justifications are and how they differ from excuses. I also hope to have shown that
some of the reasons given against the reasonable belief view of justification are not
compelling. A lot turns on whether one sees justification to apply primarily to
actions (in isolation from the beliefs, attitudes, etc. of the actor) or primarily to
agents (or to the agent's action, viewed as that agent's action). I have indicated
some reasons for thinking that the latter notion of justification is one that we
should not abandon.
